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Abstract —Tactical networks must select service providers to 
meet service requirements of an operation while facing resource 
constraints and high security vulnerability. In such an 
environment nodes provide services to support various 
operations and/ may request services to support the operations as 
well. We formulate the problem of service composition and 
service binding as a multi-objective optimization (MOO) 
problem, minimizing the service cost, while maximizing the 
quality of service (QoS) and quality of information (QoI). The 
MOO problem is essentially a node-to-service assignment 
problem such that by dynamically formulating service 
composition, and selecting the right nodes to provide requested 
services, the network can support concurrent operations while 
achieving multiple system objectives. We develop a trust-based 
service composition and binding protocol. We demonstrate that 
the trust-based scheme outperforms the counterpart non-trust-
based scheme. Furthermore, our trust-based scheme can 
effectively penalize malicious nodes performing self-promotion 
attacks, thus filtering out malicious nodes and can ultimately lead 
to high user satisfaction. 
Keywords—service composition, tactical networks, trust,  multi-
objective optimization. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Tactical networks must support concurrent operations, such 
as target tracking, field surveillance, target classification, and 
trajectory prediction. Applying service composition techniques 
[9] to compose services can effectively simplify 
implementation details while efficiently utilizing available 
resources. While dynamic service composition has been 
extensively studied for web services, little is found for tactical 
networks because a tactical operation failure is often much 
more severe than a web service failure. Moreover, most 
studies focus on maximizing quality-of-service (QoS) of a 
single service composition request without considering 
resource constraints when concurrent service composition 
requests exist, which necessitates multiple system goals to be 
considered.  
This paper considers dynamic service composition and 
service binding in a tactical network environment in which 
nodes provide services to support tactical mission operations, 
and also request services themselves. In the literature [11], the 
dynamic service composition and binding problem comes in 
two forms: (a) composition by planning in which a goal and a 
set of available services are given and the system completes 
the goal by planning and service binding using available 
services; and (b) composition by workflow process 
optimization in which the workflow with constraints is given 
as input and the service composition and binding problem is 
essentially a node-to-service assignment problem as we 
consider in this paper. We formulate the problem of service 
composition and binding as a multi-objective optimization 
(MOO) problem for maximizing QoS and QoI (quality-of-
information) while minimizing service cost.  
Our approach uses trust for making decisions on service 
composition and binding. In tactical networks, collaborating 
with sufficiently trustworthy entities is the key to successful 
mission execution assuming that selected trustworthy entities 
are sufficiently functional to execute the given mission. 
Malicious nodes may provide false information about service 
metrics; our trust-based assessment filters out these nodes 
leading to successful task completion. 
Trust-based service composition and binding also has been 
studied in the web services domain [2], [6], but only a single 
dimension of trust was considered. In order to reflect key 
capabilities required for competing tactical missions, we 
consider two key trust dimensions, competence and integrity, 
as the building blocks of a “composite” trust metric. 
To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has considered 
incorporating trust as decision criteria to solve a service 
composition and binding problem for tactical networks with 
multiple objectives. We develop an Integer Linear 
Programming (ILP) solution technique to solve this MOO 
problem. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes our system model including the tactical network 
environment, trust metric, the service model and the MOO 
problem definition. Section III describes the trust-based and 
non-trust-based service composition and service binding 
protocols.  Section V reports comparative performance results 
utilizing ILP to solve the MOO problem for both trust-based 
and non-trust-based schemes. We also conduct sensitivity 
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analyses to reveal design parameter settings under which the 
performance of our trust-based scheme can be further 
improved. Section VI concludes the paper.  
II.  SYSTEM MODEL 
A.  Tactical Network Environments  
We consider a tactical network in which nodes are 
heterogeneous such as sensors, robots, unmanned vehicles or 
other devices, which may have severe energy constraints and 
are mainly used for sensing and relaying data or implementing 
actions not suitable for human operators; nodes can be 
dismounted soldiers carrying sensors or handheld devices, or 
manned vehicles with various types of equipment, which 
possess intelligence for analyzing data before taking actions. 
In this network a node has two roles in executing operations: 
(1) a service provider (SP) to support an operation; and (2) a 
service requestor (SR) to request a service in the process of 
initiating (and executing) an operation. An example operation 
can be target tracking, field surveillance, and/or target 
classification. Each operation may require more than one 
service. For example, target tracking requires services from 
nodes with signal processing power and localization 
capability. Field surveillance can require services such as 
multi-modal signal processing, data aggregation, and intrusion 
detection. There may be cases where two services should be 
executed concurrently. We denote the abstract services by S1, 
S2, …, Sn.  
B.  Trust Metric 
We use trust to assign the right nodes as SPs to the right 
abstract services. We consider composite trust consisting of 
competence and integrity as follows:   
•  Competence: This refers to an entity’s capability to serve 
the received request by providing a satisfactory quality. 
This is often affected by (a) network conditions such as link 
failure or being disconnected by environmental conditions 
such as terrain; (b) energy level of a node (e.g., sensors vs. 
unmanned vehicles); or current workload and (c) inherent 
nature of a human entity such as willingness.  
•  Integrity: This refers to the degree to which a node 
complies with a given network protocol, not performing 
network attacks including self-promotion attacks by 
disseminating false information. That is, a node may lie 
about QoI, QoS and cost scores of its own capability and try 
to increase its chance to be included in mission operations 
in order to disrupt successful execution of the operations.   
We assume the trust values are scaled in the range of [0, 1] 
as a real number. We denote the trust of node j evaluated by 
node i in trust property X (i.e., competence or integrity) as 
. 
The overall trust is the average of these two trust values as we 
consider these two trust dimensions to be equally important in 
military missions. We adopt Bayesian inference [1], [7], [8] 
modeling trust by the Beta ( ,  ) distribution such that  /( + ) 
is the estimated trust of a SP with   as the number of positive 
service experiences and   as the number of negative service 
experiences, which are accumulated by a node as it evaluates 
the services provided to it by an SP. This trust value is 
propagated to and then aggregated by other nodes in the 
system through a trust propagation and aggregation protocol 
characterized by a parameter,   representing  the  trust 
estimation error or trust bias due to trust propagation and 
aggregation as each node updates other nodes’ trust values in a 
distributed manner. For a malicious node or a bad node, the 
worst-case is that its trust is overestimated by  over  the 
trust value propagated. In this paper, we test the resiliency of 
the trust-based service composition and binding protocol 
against self-promotion attacks under the worst case trust 
overestimation error for bad nodes.  
C.  Service Advertisement 
A node as a SP can use two methods to advertise its 
availability to provide services to the network: push method 
and pull method. 
 In  the  push method, a node as a SP continuously 
broadcasts its availability. On the other hand, the pull method 
[9], [10] enables a node to advertise its service availability 
only when a peer node (i.e., a SR) shows interest. That is, the 
push method is proactive and consumes more resources while 
the pull method reactively serves upon request, trading off 
delay for resource consumption. We adopt the pull method for 
efficient resource management. A SP responds with an 
advertisement message only if it is capable of providing 
services requested by a SR. The advertisement message 	
 
comprises four-tuple records, one for each abstract service it 
can provide as follows:  
	
     (1)
Here we use Q, D, and C to denote the QoI, delay (for QoS) 
and cost metrics. The four-tuple record for   is:  (a)   
indicating the index of the servive Sk that  the SP can provide ; 
(b)  indicating the level of QoI the SP can provide for Sk; 
(c)  indicating the level of service delay (for QoS) the SP 
can provide for Sk; and (d)  indicating the service cost the 
SP will consume to provide Sk. If a SP can provide multiple 
services, then it will have a set of four-tuple records for each 
abstract service that it can provide. We assume that the service 
quality of a SP in Q, D and C is based on a priori information 
describing a device’s capability.  
D.  Dynamic Service Composition  
        A  tactical  network  serves  multiple  tactical  operations, 
each requiring a series of abstract services. We use the 
notation Om to refer to operation m and  to refer to the 
service requester of operation m. In order to execute the given 
operation, the SR advertises its need for services. Then, 
available SPs send out advertisement messages (i.e., 	
 as 
shown in (1)). Based on the informed service availabilities, the 
SR composes a specification of the service requirements to 
execute the operation. We call the specification profile a 
service composition specification, denoted as SCS. It includes 
the schedule of required abstract services, Sk’s, and the 
required Q, D and C thresholds for each abstract service. 
Based on the SCS, the SR proceeds with the node-to-service 
assignment (NSA) process to identify the best SP set to 
maximize performance in terms of multiple objectives defined 
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in subsection F. In Section III, we will detail the process of 
NSA. An example SCS is: 
    !"  #$  (2)
Here     specifies that S2 and S4 are to be executed 
concurrently;  !"  specifies  that  S3 and S7 are to be 
executed sequentially. Each abstract service Sk is associated 
with a “hard” threshold requirement 

%&'( )
%&'( 
%&'( 
%&'(* specifying the required 
Q, D and C thresholds where 
%&'( is the minimum Q 
threshold, 
%&'(is the maximum D threshold, and 
%&'(is 
the maximum C threshold.  
E.  Service Binding  
A node capable of providing multiple services to an 
operation can be selected to execute multiple services. 
However, it may not be selected for executing concurrent 
services because this may adversely affect the Q, D and C 
outcomes due to heavy workload. If two operations overlap in 
time for service provision, a node capable of providing 
services to these two operations can at most choose one to 
execute to ensure its availability and commitment to a single 
operation. 
F.  Multiple Objective Optimization 
We consider three objectives, maximizing Q while minimizing 
D and C. These are the key criteria to measure user satisfaction. 
A SR may be a human entity such as a soldier carrying devices. 
In order to estimate the satisfaction level for the services 
provided for an operation, the SR can hold two standards: hard 
standard vs. soft standard. The hard standard is the Q, D and 
C threshold requirement 
%&'( for Sk. This is a strict standard 
that each service must comply to meet user satisfaction. If there 
is no SP available to provide the service, or if the SP selected to 
provide the service fails to meet the threshold requirement, then 
the operation is regarded as having failed. The soft standard 
measures user satisfaction for the provided services in terms of 
the overall Q, D and C service levels achieved, i.e.,  
 + 
,-.
/ + 
,-.
/  + 
,-.
  (3)
-is the set of abstract services  requested by 0/  and 
  are the operation-level Q, D, and C achieved, and  
and  are the service-level Q, D, and C achieved by 
node i. Higher Q and lower D and C are desirable. 
We capture the multiple objectives into a single scalar 
function to be maximized: 
100  +2 3  3 4
,5
678 3  3   (4)
where 5 is the set of operations.  
G. Trust-based Reward and Penalty 
We use trust as a reward (i.e., an incentive) or penalty to a 
node that has provided a service, since maintaining a 
sufficiently high trust level is important for tactical operation 
execution.  
An operation can impose a minimum user satisfaction 
threshold, denoted as USTm. This is to be compared against 
the user satisfaction received (9), defined as: 
9 1 : ;2

<=

>?@<A? 

>?@<A?

<= 

>?@<A?

<= 4 
(5)
Here
>?@<A? 
>?@<A? and 
>?@<A?  are calculated by 
(3) based on advertised Q, D and C scores, while
<= 
<= 
and 
<=  are calculated by (3) based on true Q, D and C   
scores. The rationale of defining 9as above is that a user 
(i.e., a SR) does not have knowledge of the “best” service 
quality, so its satisfaction level with services received is based 
on what has been promised to be delivered. Recall that 
malicious nodes may perform self-promotion attacks to 
advertise higher Q, and lower D and C scores to boost its 
chance of node-to-service assignment. Since good nodes 
always advertise true scores faithfully, USRm =1 if  
selects only good nodes to provide services requested.  
 compares USTm against USRm to incentivize or 
penalize a SP by increasing or decreasing its trust. When USRm 
exceeds USTm, it is counted as a positive experience and all 
SPs in Om are rewarded. As described in Section II.B, the Beta 
( ,  ) distribution is used for trust assessment by the SRs. In 
the case of positive experience,   is incremented by 1 for all 
SPs in Om (to both integrity and competence). On the other 
hand, when  USRm is less than USTm,    identifies  the 
culprits with low performance (by comparing the advertised 
service quality profile with the actual received service) and 
considers it a negative experience against these culprits. In this 
case,   is increased by 1 for all identified culprits. Other SPs 
identified as benign will not be penalized. Every node in the 
system keeps track of   and   counts for all SPs in the system. 
The trust change toward a SP will then be propagated to make 
it known to other nodes in the network. 
III.  SERVICE COMPOSITION AND BINDING SCHEMES 
Once the SCS for Om is dynamically formulated based on 
service availability (i.e., available nodes), multiple node-to-
service assignment (NSA) solutions may exist to meet the 
service requirements and constraints specified. Which NSA 
solution to pick depends on if Om is standalone. If Om is 
standalone, the service requester  for Om then chooses the 
best NSA solution among all candidate solutions to maximize 
100   3  3 B If  Om executes concurrently with 
some other operations in a concurrent operation set C, then 
 cooperates with other SRs in the concurrent operation set 
to collectively choose the best set of NSA solutions (one for 
each operation in set C) to maximize MOO in (4) with D=C.  
We propose two dynamic service composition and binding 
schemes, non-trust-based and trust-based, as follows:   
• Non-trust-based:  selects the best NSA solution based 
on advertised Q, D and C scores. In this scheme, fully 
trusts all service advertisements even if malicious nodes may 
lie about their Q, D and C scores. Objective metrics, 
 and  are computed based on (3). 
• Trust-based:  selects the best NSA solution where each 
objective is computed by a trust-weighted sum. That is, , 
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Dm and  are computed the same way as in (3) except that 
the trust of     toward node i selected for operation 
execution (:BEB '.) is taken into consideration as follows:  
 + )  '. F *
,-.
/ 
 + )  G'.*
,-.
/ + )  G'.*
,-.
 
(6)
Here  '.   is the overall trust of    toward node i, 
calculated by HBI'.
J KH B I  '.
L assuming competence and 
integrity are equally important. The benefit of the trust-based 
scheme is that the advertised Q, D and C scores are attested by 
the trust levels of SPs evaluated by the SR. If all nodes are 
trustworthy with a trust value of 1, then the trust-based 
solution reduces to the non-trust-based solution. For the trust-
based scheme, we further introduce two trust thresholds, 
J 
and 
L for competence and integrity, respectively, such that 
node i is qualified for the execution of operation m only if  

J M '.
J  and 
L M '.
L B  
IV.  PROBLEM DEFINITION AND PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION   
A given mission consists of multiple operations; an 
operation requires a set of abstract services some of which 
may need to run concurrently while others must run 
consecutively. Services are characterized by QoI (Q), Delay 
(D) and Cost (C) metrics. Associated with each requested 
service in an operation are thresholds on minimum QoI, 
maximum delay and maximum cost.  A node responsible for 
an operation sends out service requests, and available service 
providers (SPs) respond with the Q, D, and C metrics for the 
services that they can provide. Given that multiple SPs may 
meet the threshold criteria, the goal is to choose SPs so as to 
minimize aggregate D and C and maximize aggregate Q, 
where the aggregation is first over the set of services 
constituting an operation, and then over the set of operations 
constituting the mission. The multiple objectives are captured 
by a single scalar function, MOO = Q - D - C, where Q, D, 
and C are aggregate values. This is an assignment problem: 
which SP should be assigned to which abstract service in 
which operation. Malicious nodes may advertise false Q, D, 
and C metrics; detecting and filtering out such nodes is 
crucial.  The notion of a user-satisfaction ratio is used to mark 
provided services as positive or negative; these are then used 
to update the posterior distribution of trust, modeled as a Beta 
distribution. The mean of the distribution is used as an 
estimate of trust. 
In the trust-based version, to be qualified, a SP's trust scores 
must be above prescribed thresholds. The service-level 
components of Q, D, and C for a given operation are scaled by 
the trust score for the corresponding SP. The idea is that nodes 
that have previously advertised false Q, D, and C metrics are 
less trustworthy; hence, their metrics are discounted. 
V.  NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Our preliminary case study is for a small size problem with 
15 operations (N5N=15) and 60 nodes (|O|=60) as SPs for 
dynamic service composition and service binding. The 15 
operations are divided into 9 sequential chunks, i.e., {1, 2}, 
{3}, {4, 5}, {6, 7, 8}, {9}, {10}, {11, 12}, {13}, and {14, 15}. 
For simplicity, each operation is composed of 4 distinct 
abstract services2N-PN= 4) randomly selected from S0 to S8. 
Further, each SP is assumed to be specialized to one abstract 
service only. Thus, a SP can be assigned to at most one service 
in an operation. Furthermore, for reliability reasons, no SP can 
service more than one operation concurrently. 
We consider a tactical network environment where all 
nodes can communicate with each other, so mobility is not an 
issue for communication. We set the two trust thresholds to 

J  HBI and 
L  HBI  so that every SP with trust not less 
than 0.5 will have a chance to provide service. The 
L  and 
J 
values for integrity and competence are set to 0.5 initially for 
all nodes with ( =1,  =1), meaning ignorance (no knowledge). 
As node i accumulates positive and negative experiences for 
services provided by node j, node i updates its trust toward 
node j based on trust penalty/reward described in Section II.G.  
We model the hostility of the environment by the 
percentage of malicious nodes, denoted as Pbad in the range of 
H3I H Q. The risk taking behavior of a malicious node is 
modeled by a percentage of boosting parameter, Prisk. That is, a 
malicious node will boost its advertised Q, D and C scores by 
multiplying its true Q, D and C scores with (1+Prisk), (1 Prisk), 
(1 Prisk), respectively, to increase its chance of being selected.  
       TABLE I. KEY PARAMETERS AND DEFAULT VALUES/RANGES 
Parameter Value Parameter Value  Parameter Value
N-N  4 N5N   10  
L  / 
J  0.5
Terr / Pbad [0-50%] |O|  60 Dgood / Cgood [1-2]
Prisk [0-100%] 
L   0.5 Dbad / Cbad [3-5]
USTm [75-100%] 
J  0.5 Qbad, Qgood  [1-3], [4-5]
Table I lists key parameters and their default values. In 
particular, Qbad, Dbad and Cbad are the true Q, D and C scores 
for bad nodes, which can be boosted during service 
advertisement. Qgood, Dgood and Cgood are the true Q, D and C 
scores for good nodes, which will be reported by good nodes 
faithfully during service advertisement. The Q, D, C values for 
a node are generated once following uniform distribution at 
the beginning and are not changed during system operation.   
We solve the dynamic service composition and service 
binding MOO problem as defined in (4) with ILP techniques. 
The detail of the ILP formulation is given in the Appendix. 
We apply the ILP solution technique to both non-trust-based 
using, Dm and   defined in (3), and trust-based using 
, Dm and  defined in (6). The end product obtained by 
using MATLAB is expressed by a decision variable R 
specifying if node j should be assigned to abstract service Sk 
of operation m so that the MOO value defined in (4) is 
maximized. Dynamic trust update is implemented by an 
iterative ILP solution technique in which the ILP solution is 
applied sequentially to “operation chunks” in time order where 
a chunk is defined as a set of overlapping operations.  
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Depending on the outcome of the user satisfaction 
condition defined in (5), trust toward the nodes assigned to 
execute a chunk is updated and reflected as input to the next 
ILP execution. The 15 operations in our experiment require 9 
ILP executions since these 15 operations are separated into 9 
non-overlapping chunks in time order.  
The underlying assumption of our iterative ILP solution 
technique is that trust values are static during the execution of 
each chunk, which is justified since trust is updated only after 
a tactical operation is executed. Below we report experimental 
results obtained from ILP solutions to examine the effect of 
key parameters, including Pbad (percentage of malicious nodes), 
Prisk (level of risk taking by a malicious node), USTm (user 
satisfaction threshold), and Terr (trust bias). The results 
reported are based on the average of 100 runs with random 
seeds to generate true Q, D and C scores for good and bad 
nodes. The assignments of the specific abstract service that 
can be provided by each SP, the 4 distinct services that are 
required by each operation and the bad node selection given 
Pbad as input are also randomly generated but remain the same 
across the 100 runs. 
Fig. 1 compares the two schemes in terms of , , , and 
100 values for the case in which Pbad = 30%, Prisk = 70% and 
USTm = 90%, with Terr varying in the range of 0% to 50%. The 
effect of Terr is modeled by trust overestimation for bad nodes 
to test the resiliency property of the trust-based scheme against 
self-promotion attacks. We see that trust-based scheme can 
still perform better than the non-trust-based scheme when the 
trust estimation error is bounded within 30%, that is, the MOO 
and Q values are higher while the D and C values are lower 
because of its ability to discern trustworthy SPs from 
untrustworthy ones. However, when the trust estimation error 
exceeds a threshold (30% in this case), the advantage of trust-
based scheme to filter out untrustworthy nodes disappears 
because bad nodes (30% in this case) may have high 
subjective trust and can be selected to execute operations by 
mistake, especially if they aggressively lie about their service 
quality (Prisk=70% in this case). The trust estimation error may 
be introduced because of trust propagation and aggregation 
error. We note that many contemporary trust systems can limit 
the trust estimation error to 3-5% (e.g., [3], [4], [5]) which is 
much less than the threshold of 30%.  
Fig. 2 shows that the performances of both schemes 
deteriorate as the percentage of bad nodes increases. However, 
the trust-based scheme is able to filter out bad nodes 
effectively (despite Terr=20%) and is less vulnerable to bad 
node population increase compared with the non-trust-based 
approach. Fig. 3 analyzes the effect of Prisk on performance. 
We observe a trend similar to that in Fig. 2. While the non-
trust-based scheme helplessly accepts bad nodes that boost 
their advertised scores, the trust-based scheme is able to filter 
out untrustworthy nodes (Terr=20% in this case).  
 
Fig. 4. Effect of user satisfaction threshold (USTm). 
 
Fig. 5. User satisfaction received (9) per operation. 
Fig. 4 examines the impact of USTm on protocol 
performance, with USTm varying in the range of 75%-100%. 
Fig. 5 compares USRm on an operation by operation basis in 
time order for the trust-based scheme operating at USTm=75% 
and 90% against the non-trust-based scheme. We consider a 
combination of Prisk=70%, Pbad=30% and Terr=20% to reveal 
interesting trends. Because of high Prisk and Terr, the trust-
 
Fig.1. MOO, Q, D and C objective values vs. trust 
estimation error (Terr) under trust-based and non-trust-
based schemes.  
Fig. 2. MOO value vs. percentage of bad nodes 
(Pbad). 
 
Fig. 3. Effect of risk taking by a malicious node 
(Prisk). 
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based scheme is fooled into selecting bad nodes in the first 
few operations. So the first 8 operations do not pass the user 
satisfaction threshold. As a result, bad nodes selected to 
provide services in the first 8 operations are penalized with 
trust decrease and likely to be filtered out from later operations. 
This is evidenced by the result that the last 7 operations have 
high 9 values. We see that 9 values in the last 7 
operations under USTm=90% are higher than those under 
USTm=75% because a higher user satisfaction threshold tends 
to cause more negative experiences and thus induces more 
trust penalty to be applied to bad nodes. In particular, 9 is 
close to 100% for 3 of the last 7 operations when USTm=90% 
because only good nodes are being selected by the trust-based 
scheme due to dynamic trust update. On the contrary, the non-
trust-based scheme consistently yields a low 9 operation 
by operation because it has no effective way of filtering out 
bad nodes. Overall, the MOO function value increases (and 
levels off) as USTm increases as demonstrated in Fig. 4. This 
trend supports our claim that the trust based scheme can 
effectively achieve high user satisfaction for MOO service 
quality despite the presence of bad nodes performing self-
promotion attacks, especially after the system runs through the 
first few operations to stabilize trust update.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
We proposed a trust-based service composition and service 
binding protocol for a tactical network where we are 
concerned with multi-objective optimization. By utilizing an 
iterative integer linear programming solution technique for 
solving both trust-based and non-trust-based optimization 
problems, we demonstrate that our trust-based scheme 
outperforms the non-trust-based counterpart in user 
satisfaction. Furthermore, our trust-based scheme can 
effectively penalize malicious nodes performing self-
promotion attacks, effectively filtering out malicious nodes, 
and can ultimately lead to high user satisfaction. 
APPENDIX  
In this appendix, we provide the implementation detail of 
the ILP solution technique for solving the node-to-service 
MOO assignment problem.   
TABLE II. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS FOR ILP 
Variable Definition 
STU  1 if operations p and q are overlapping in time; 0 
otherwise 
V  1 if node j can provide abstract service k; 0 otherwise 
:;  1, if operation m requires abstract service k; 
0, otherwise 
WW  1 if 
J M X.
J 7;

L M X.
L ; 0 otherwise  
W  V F: ;  FWW  
R  1 if node j is assigned to service k in operation m;  0 
otherwise (output) 
Table II defines the variables used in the ILP formulation. 
The binary variables STUV :;  and WWsummarize the 
service composition specifications for the operations as well as 
status and capability of the  nodes, given as input to the ILP. 
There is only one decision variable, namely, R  to  be 
determined by the ILP, specifying if node j should be assigned 
to abstract service k of operation m. The ILP will search for an 
optimal solution of Rfor all j’s, k’s and m’s to maximize 
MOO in both trust-based and non-trust-based schemes. The 
objective function MOO Y 26 3 6 3 64 6,5  as defined by 
(3), (4) and (6) can be computed as a linear function of R 
(the only decision variable to be decided by the ILP). The 
service-to-node assignment MOO problem is formulated as 
follows:  
Given: 5-PZS TUV :; WW 
Find: R  
Maximize: Y 2 3  3 4 ,5  
Subject to: [\ []^_` STU F 2 R T KR U4Ma / 
Y R  : ; / R MW    
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